

**ALMEIDA'S COMMENT ON D. READ  
"GENERATIVE CROW-OMAHA TERMINOLOGIES"**

**MAURO W. BARBOSA DE ALMEIDA  
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS  
MALMEIDA@UNICAMP.BR**

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4

5 **MAURO W. BARBOSA DE ALMEIDA**  
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7 **Introduction**

8 Read’s research program for describing the “generative logic” of distinct kinship  
9 terminologies in a homogeneous framework has proved its fruitfulness in different ethnographic  
10 domains, ranging from North American kinship to Dravidian terminologies, and more. Applied  
11 now to the so-called Omaha systems, the framework suggests a new taxonomy of kinship  
12 terminologies, in which Thonga kinship terminology – until now a type specimen for the Omaha  
13 terminology, based on Junod’s ethnography – is separated from Fox kinship terminology, another  
14 type specimen of the Omaha, as described by Dorsey, and Morgan before him. Read’s thesis,  
15 therefore, subverts Lounsbury’s subdivision of “Omaha” taxon in four varieties, among which  
16 “Type I” was instanced by the Fox terminology, while Type III had Thonga data as a standard  
17 representative. According to Read, on the other hand, Fox and Thonga are not “Omaha” varieties  
18 at all; they are instead “whale and fish”, resulting from different structural principles. Read’s thesis  
19 also challenges another anthropological accepted wisdom: the role of crossness and affinity in the  
20 logic of so-called bifurcate-merging systems such as Iroquois and Omaha (Trautmann and  
21 Whiteley 2012).

22 On the methodological side, Read’s approach corroborates the view according to which the  
23 semantical/ontological aspects of kinship language and its pragmatic-performative uses can be  
24 isolated from its the “internal” computational dimension. In this sense, his approach coincides with  
25 Lounsbury’s views. However, Read’s framework differs from Lounsbury’s approach in two  
26 points, namely, the use of vernacular terms as far as possible instead of kin types, and the  
27 requirement of “culturally grounded rules” to justify formal schemata. A more fundamental  
28 difference between Lounsbury’s and Read’s views is the role of a cognatic terminological in  
29 Lounsbury’s formalism – where generation and gender play a symmetrical role in kinship

1 expressions -- as opposed to the priority of an agnatic terminology in Read's schemata, to which  
2 gender change is appended as a secondary feature.

3 One might wonder about the relevance of such issues to wider anthropological disputes. It  
4 is an unfortunate turn of events that Claude Lévi-Strauss, who made a major contribution to give  
5 kinship issues a main place social theory, with his "alliance" approach as an alternative to the  
6 "descent" theory (or rather as a complement to it), also opposed Lounsbury's calculus on the  
7 grounds of its "formalism". Lévi-Strauss rejected also Vladimir Propp's generative analysis of  
8 folk-tales for the same reason, although both Lounsbury and Propp qualified as representatives of  
9 a structural approach in generative format amenable to everyone's usage. Lévi-Strauss's goal was  
10 a single grand theory that would simultaneously account for kinship terminologies, kinship  
11 ontologies and marriage rules/frequencies – or rather, a theory that would be supported by evidence  
12 from all these domains. This was "a bridge too far", to employ the idiom of the Second World  
13 War. For these domains, although empirically overlapping, are independent of each other.

14

### 15 **The program**

16 "The goal of the formal analysis is to determine the logic by which the structure of the  
17 Thonga kinship terminology shown in Figure 1 with its skewing of male, matrilineal kin  
18 terms, can be generated —or, alternatively, that *there is no such logic upon which the*  
19 *terminology is based.*"

20

21 It is not my intention to refute Read's representation of the logic underlying Thong kinship  
22 terminology, expressed in diagrammatic form, but, rather, to suggest that there is more than one  
23 way to represent it. Let me therefore recapitulate three methodological steps proposed by Read as  
24 appropriate to the analysis of a wide range of kinship terminologies.

25 First, a lineal structure of male terms is generated. Then, female terms are generated by  
26 means of a *female self* transformation applied on male terms. The *female self* transformation has  
27 no empirical correspondence to a *kinship term*. I assume that it acts by changing the male origin  
28 (*male self*) into its opposite-sex sibling's *self*, the *female self*, taken now as the origin.

29 Thonga terminology is distinguished from other terminologies, according to Read, because  
30 the *female self* transformation is the *only* "female generator". This means, if I understand the  
31 argument correctly, that the *female self* is not further composed with kinship terms such as

1 “♀*mamana*♀” or “♀*tatana*♂”, to generate terms as ♀*mamana*♀*makwana*♂ = ♀*kokwana*♂. For,  
2 along Read’s analysis, from the point of view of a “female speaker”, the only possible composition  
3 is ♀*female self*♀*female sex*♀ = ♀*female sex*♀. The “female self” is a dead end.

4 This argument brings the term *mamana* (“mother”) into question.

5 For it would seem that, from a female point of view, ♀*mamana*♀ could be iterated with  
6 itself, producing ♀*mamana*♀*mamana*♀ = ♀*kokwana*♀. Furthermore, ♀*mamana*♀’s reciprocal  
7 ♀*ñwana*♀, could be iterated to produce ♀*ñwana*♀*ñwana*♀ = ♀*ntusulu*♀. Finally, from the  
8 “female self” point of view, ♀*mamana*♀*ñwana*♀ = ♀*makwabu*♀. These operations, composed  
9 with each other, generate a terminological matriline isomorphic to its male counterpart, where in  
10 particular ♀*mamana*♀*ñwana*♀ includes ♀”*female self*”♀ as a particular case of *makwabu*  
11 (“*sibling*”).

12 If this argument is right, it means that the terminology allows the expression of a “matriline”  
13 of “female terms” from the female point of view in the same way as a “patriline” is generated  
14 from the male point of view”.<sup>i</sup> This point is confirmed by the symmetry between Omaha and  
15 Crow as the effect of a change in the point of view – or, in geometrical language, of changing the  
16 origin of coordinates.

17 Against this alternative analysis, Read argues that ♂*mamana*♀ (“my mother”, male  
18 speaker) does not act as a generator, and should be analyzed as ♂*tatana*♂*nsati*♀ (♂”father’s wife”  
19 ♀). This is Read’s point:

20

21 “Thongan terminology excludes the mother relation as a primary generating concept” (Read  
22 2018: 41),

23

24 because

25

26 “... the affine kin term product, (*kokwana* (‘opposite sex sibling’) [is the product of] *nsati*  
27 (‘wife’) of *tatana* (‘father’)). (Read 2018: 42).  
28

28

29 This argument explains the ♀*mamana*♀ relation as being the product ♂*tatana*♂*nsati*♀. In  
30 kin types, this means replacing ♂M♀ with ♂FW<sup>ii</sup> because the only “female generator” is ♀Z♀<sup>iii</sup>  
31 According to this analysis, Thonga terminology identifies culturally a “step mother” (a father’s

1 wife) with a “mother” – by *equating* “mother” with “step-mother” as in American Kinship  
2 terminology. But there is more, because in American kinship terminology the “mother” term  
3 generates a “mother’s brother” category (an *uncle*), while in the Thonga case Read’s excludes this  
4 possibility. “Mother” seems to lead to nowhere in Thonga terminology according to Read.

5 This move has ethnographic justification in some patrilineal societies where a “mother” is  
6 a “father’s wife”, a point supported by Junod’s ethnography in a sense. However, Read’s rejection  
7 of *mamana* as having a “procreation” meaning is contradicted by Junod’s strong emphasis in the  
8 *mamana*’s (a man’s father’s wife) role of producing legitimate offspring to the man’s lineage. This  
9 means that the “procreative” power of *mamana* is of the essence. For, if the father’s wife ( $\text{♂natsi♀}$   
10 from the father’s point of view) leaves her husband, or cannot bear children to his lineage, the  
11 husband can claim another wife for whom his lineage has already paid the *lobolo*, or bride-wealth.  
12 The “potential wives” can be “wife’s younger sister” or a “wife’s brother’s daughter”. The second  
13 possibility is expressed terminologically by Lounsbury’s Type I Omaha rule, phrased as an affine  
14 rule by Kohler (1897:106-07, 134-35; cf.1975).

15 After this general outline of my argument, I comment in detail the “core structure of male  
16 terms”, looking for its underlying mathematical structure (see also Appendix I).

17 “The first layer is a core structure of ascending kin terms generated using primary ascending  
18 kin term(s) identified as the generating term(s) for the ascending structure ... we generate the  
19 Thonga terminology by first generating the structure of ascending and descending male terms  
20 shown in the kin term map of male terms displayed in Figure 2” (Read, p. 12)

21 I understand Read’s stance as expressing a commitment to Radcliffe-Brown’s “unit of  
22 lineage” principle. This commitment is consistent with Read’s rejection of Lounsbury’s “cognatic”  
23 analysis. I will now go into the role of the “female terms” in more detail, since it plays an essential  
24 role in this issue.

25 Read, as already mentioned, uses as a “female generator”, the “female self” concept. From  
26 the male point of view, this theoretical term is expressed as  $\text{♂self female♀}$ , transporting the ‘ego’  
27 place to a “female” origin. From that origin, “self female” becomes  $\text{♀self female♀}$ , which is a  
28 dead end since it behaves as an identity (that is,  $\text{♀self female♀self female♀} = \text{♀self female♀}$ ).

1           As an application of Read’s procedure, I give the generation of  $\text{♂}rarana_{\text{♀}}$  as a “female  
2 *self*” version of  $\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}$ . That is to say:  $\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}\text{female self}_{\text{♀}} = \text{♂}rarana_{\text{♀}}$  ( $[\text{♂}F\text{♂}Z_{\text{♀}}] =$   
3 *ranana*). In the usual representation, using vernacular terms, the natural derivation would  
4  $\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}\text{makwabu}_{\text{♀}} = \text{♂}rarana_{\text{♀}}$ , where  $\text{♂}makwabu_{\text{♀}}$  ( $\text{♂}Z_{\text{♀}}$ ) stands for the context-bound use  
5 of the sex-neutral *makwabu* term.

6           On the other hand, the  $\text{♂}mamana_{\text{♀}}$  term ( $\text{♂}M_{\text{♀}} = \text{♂}ZM_{\text{♀}}$  by standard notation and half-  
7 sibling rules) – given the exclusion of  $\text{♂}mamana_{\text{♀}}$  as a generator – must be expressed by Read as  
8  $\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}\text{nsati}_{\text{♀}} = \text{♂}mamana_{\text{♀}}$  ( $\text{♂}FW = \text{♂}M$ ). Here, however,  $\text{♂}nsati_{\text{♀}}$  is not a “female self”  
9 term, but an *affine* term for “wife”. And by this path we are led to the existence of *two* generators  
10 to extend the “male core”: the “female self” (a dead end) and the “opposite-sex affine” ( $\text{♂}nsati_{\text{♀}}$ ,  
11  $\text{♂}FW_{\text{♀}}$ ) as the linkage between the male patrilineage and its affine (wife-giving) lineage.

12           The postulated primacy of the “male core” has as an important corollary: the elimination  
13 of “crossness” and “affinity” as explanatory constructs.

14           For crossness and affinity amount to the ordered alternance of “generation” and “sex”  
15 terms, as in  $F\text{♂}Z_{\text{♀}}S_{\text{♂}}$  and  $M_{\text{♀}}B\text{♂}D_{\text{♀}}$  in the case of crossness, and, in the case of affinity,  
16  $\text{♂}S\text{♂}Z_{\text{♀}}M_{\text{♀}}B_{\text{♂}} = \text{♂}WB$ , and  $\text{♀}D_{\text{♀}}B\text{♂}F\text{♂}Z_{\text{♀}} = \text{♀}HZ$ . Indeed, these relations cannot be  
17 represented as female replicas of male terms, that is to say, as the result of a single “♂female self♀  
18 transformation of a “♂male self♂.

19           And, if a man’s father’s sister [ $\text{♂}FZ$ ] = *rarana* can be represented formally as a “female  
20 replica” (i.e. an opposite-sex sibling) of a “male term” [ $(\text{♂}F)\text{♂}Z_{\text{♀}}$ ] = *rarana*, a man’s “mother’s  
21 brother” [ $\text{♂}MB$ ] = [ $\text{♂}FWB$ ] = *kokwana* is **not** a female replica of a “father”<sup>iv</sup>. The reason is that  
22 [ $\text{♂}FWB$ ] has the form [ $(\text{♂}F)(\text{♂}W_{\text{♀}})(\text{♀}B)$ ], or, according to the chosen parsing (cf. Tjon Sie Fat  
23 1998 on the role of non-associativity),

24

$$\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}\text{nsati}_{\text{♀}}\text{male self}_{\text{♂}} = (\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}\text{nsati}_{\text{♀}})(\text{♀}makwabu_{\text{♂}}) = [\text{♂}MB^+\text{♂}] = \textit{kokwana}$$

$$(\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}\text{nsati}_{\text{♀}}\text{male self}_{\text{♂}}) = (\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}})(\text{♂}nsati_{\text{♀}}\text{self}_{\text{♂}}) = [\text{♂}FWB^-] = \textit{malume}.$$

25  
26  
27

28           In this analysis, I added the signs “+” and “-” to express relative age differences. It is hard  
29 to see how *kokwana* results from the action of  $\text{♂}female self_{\text{♀}}$  in a male term  $\text{♂}tatana_{\text{♂}}$ , without

1 the intervention of  $\text{♂nsati♀}$ . But  $\text{♂nsati♀}$  cannot be the female transform of  $\text{♂tatana♂}$  because  
2  $\text{♂tatana♂female self♀} = \text{♂rarana♀}$ .<sup>v</sup>

3 The conclusion to be drawn is that Read’s options were: either to exclude  $\text{♀mamana♀}$  as  
4 a female generator, and including  $\text{♂nsati♀}$  as an affine generator, or accepting  $\text{♀mamana♀}$  as a  
5 female generator, and then generating  $\text{♂M♀} = \text{♂Z♀M♀} = \text{♂FW♀}$  as the product  $\text{♂mamana♀} =$   
6  $\text{♂makwana♀mamana♀} = \text{♂tatana♂nsati♀}$ .

7

8 ***Kokwana***

9 I will focus now on the term *kokwana*, the centerpiece of Read’s argument, since this is a  
10 term affected by “skewing rules” that Read discards as unnecessary for explanatory purposes.  
11 According to Junod, *kokwana* is primarily a term for  $\text{♂FF}$ , extended to  $\text{♂FM}$ , and equivalent kin  
12 types subject to same-sex sibling rules. This class is labelled by Read as *kokwana-a*, which can be  
13 represented as  $\text{♂kokwana} (\text{♂}, \text{♀})$ . Next, the *kokwana-a* class  $\{\text{♂FF}, \text{♂FZ}, \dots\}$  is further extended  
14 to *kokwana-b*  $\{\text{♂FF}, \text{♂FZ}, \text{♂MM}, \text{♂MF}\}$  and equivalent kin types.

15 *Kokwana-b* is thus the union of the agnatic lineage and of the uterine lineage as the  $G^{+2}$   
16 generation. In a third step, *kokwana-b* is further extended to a larger class *kokwana*, by adding the  
17 “mother’s brother”. We obtain therefore: **kokwana** = *kokwana-a* U *kokwana-b* U  $\{\text{♂MB}\}$ . This  
18 means: **kokwana** =  $\{\text{♂FF}, \text{♂FM}; \text{♂MF}, \text{♂MM}; \text{♂MB}\}$  where all terms equivalent to the terms  
19 within brackets by same-sex sibling rules are supposed to be included within the brackets.

20 The point now is: how is this *last* extension of *kokwana* justified? And, in particular, how  
21 is  $[\text{♂MB}] = \text{kokwana}$  obtained as the action of the “female self” on the male core, without  
22 appealing to an *affine* transformation? According to the above chain of extensions, this conclusion  
23 requires first, the terminological identification of a father’s father with a father’s sister; then the  
24 transformation of a father’s sister into a *mother’s mother* (a “father’s wife’s mother); and finally,  
25 the transformation of a *mother’s mother* into a *mother*. But this is the “Omaha” Type III Rule  
26 according to Lounsbury, in the form  $\text{♂MM} \rightarrow \text{♂MZ}$ .

27 To anticipate my conclusions, I think that Read rightly pointed out that Lounsbury’s rules  
28 do not fully account for the differences between Fox and Thonga “skewness” – even allowing for  
29 Lounsbury’s distinction between Type I Omaha rule and Type III Omaha rule. However, I see the

1 source of the anomalous behavior or *kokwana* in the combination of *relative age* and *affinity*, rather  
2 than in the agnatic *lineage* structure with a single “female generating term”, as Read does.

3 How is the *kokwana* term, with its meaning as  $\text{♂MB}$  subsumed under  $\text{♂MBF}$  explained by  
4 a “female self” transformation of a “male lineage core”? I will follow Read’s explanation of the  
5 logic underlying this use of *kokwana* in Tsonga kinship terminology. The following quotation is  
6 Read’s explanation, with number added between brackets, to distinguish the different statements  
7 contained in the explanation as well as the inferences that connect them:

8 “The term *kokwana* denotes, essentially, “ancestral relatives of my parents,” a grouping  
9 that can be conceptually divided into those ancestral to my father (*kokwana-a*) and those  
10 ancestral to my mother (*kokwana-b*). [1] Mother’s brother is included in the latter because  
11 [2] the only candidate for *ñwana* (‘son’) of *kokwana-b* is ***kokwana*** (see Figure 6) [3] if we  
12 think of *kokwana-b* as being determined by *tatana* (‘father’) of *mamana* (‘mother’) =  
13 *kokwana-b* (‘maternal grandfather’), [4] with *kokwana* (‘mother’s brother’) included in the  
14 covering term *kokwana* [5] by virtue of *ñwana* (‘son’) of *kokwana-b* = *kokwana* [6] (that  
15 is, *kokwana* as a covering term, includes all instances of *kokwana*, namely *kokwana-a*,  
16 *kokwana-b* and *kokwana*), then there is no genealogical oddity” (p. 22, brackets added).

17 The task at hand is to obtain the inclusion of “mother’s brother” at  $G^{+1}$  in the *kokwana-b*  
18 term at  $G^{+2}$  (implying  $\text{♂MB} = \text{♂MF}$ ), from the assumption of a male lineage (agnatic) structure  
19 with a “single female term”, with the role of an absorbing term. I must say that I struggled hard to  
20 follow the reasoning. I will break down the argument in separate statements, to make clear my  
21 understanding of it, without claiming that I fully understood it. The first statement [1] says that  
22 “mother’s brother” ( $\text{♂MB}$ ) is included in *kokwana-b*, which means that  $\text{kokwana-b} = \{\text{♂FF}, \text{♂FZ}\}$   
23  $\cup \{\text{♂MB}\}$ . This is so because, given the definition of *kokwana-b* as  $\{\text{♂FF}, \text{♂MF}\}$ , the equivalence  
24 class of  $\text{♂MB}$  is included in the equivalence class  $\{\text{♂FF}, \text{♂MF}\}$ . This implies that  $\text{♂MB} \equiv \text{♂MF}$ ,  
25 and since  $\text{♂MF} = \text{♂FF}$ ,  $\text{♂MB}$  is included in the equivalence class of  $\text{♂FF}$  in virtue of the  
26 transitivity of the “same-sex sibling” relation.

27 This is a consequence of Lounsbury’s Type III Omaha Rule (Corollary).

28 But instead of taking this equivalence as an axiom (as Lounsbury did), Read justifies it by  
29 a series of assertions. First, [2] says that “son” of  $\text{♂MF}$  is  $\text{♂MB}$ :  $\text{♂MFS} = \text{♂MB}$ . This inference  
30 is a consequence of Lounsbury’s “merging rule”. Next, [3] says that the equivalence class of  $\text{♂MF}$   
31 (*kokwana-b*) is the product of the equivalence classes of  $\text{♂M}$  ( $\text{♂mamana♀}$ ) and  $\text{♀F♂}$  ( $\text{♀tatana}$ ),.

1 that is to say, that  $\text{♂MF} = \text{♂MF}$ . This is a mere tautology. Therefore, the weight of the explanation  
 2 falls on [4] and [5]. Now, [4] says that “mother’s brother” is equivalent to “mother’s father” and  
 3 “father’s father” (*kokwana*) ( $\text{♂MB} = \text{♂MF}$ ), and this is a re-statement of Lounsbury’s Type III rule.  
 4 Next, [5] says that  $\text{♂MBS} = \text{♂MB}$ , a re-statement of [1]. Finally, [6] says that *kokwana* = { $\text{♂FF}$ ,  
 5  $\text{♂MF}$ ,  $\text{♂MB}$ }. And this is of course the same as [1].

6 If these translations make sense, then the whole reasoning is circular. Instead, I believe that  
 7 the real point is to reiterate that [ $\text{♂MB}$  { $\text{♂}$ ,  $\text{♀}$ }] =  $\text{♂kokwana}$  { $\text{♀}$ ,  $\text{♂}$ } is not generated through  
 8  $\text{♂mamana♀makwana♂}$  ( $\text{♂MB♂}$ ), nor as  $\text{♂WB}$  in a “affine” version (i.e. through  
 9  $\text{♂tatana♂nsati♀}$ ), which would amount to generating  $\text{♂kokwana♂}$  through a  $\text{♂tatana♂}$  followed  
 10 by an affine link ( $\text{♂nsati♀}$ ). The circuitous alternative is to generate  $\text{♂MB}$  { $\text{♂}$ ,  $\text{♀}$ } =  $\text{♂kokwana}$   
 11 { $\text{♂}$ ,  $\text{♀}$ } by a detour through  $\text{♂FF} = \text{♂MF} = \text{♂MB}$ , i.e. to as an extension of  $\text{♂kokwana}$  to include  
 12 the “only female product”:  $\text{♂female♀}$  and  $\text{♂female♀mother♀}$  read as  $\text{♂father♂wife+♀} = \text{♂FWB}$   
 13 =  $\text{♂MB}$ . I have here used a mixed notation – keeping in mind that the whole point of Read’s  
 14 approach is to circumvent the  $\text{♂MB}$  path, subsuming it under  $\text{♂FWB}$  and including  $\text{♂FWB}$  in  
 15  $\text{♂FM}$ .

16 I suppose therefore that Read’s intention is to argue that *kokwana* (in the sense of  $\text{♂MB}$ )  
 17 is “generated” through the extension of the “primary” meaning of *kokwana-a* ( $\text{♂FF♂}$ ) to  
 18 *kokwana-b* (a “neutral term” including  $\text{♂FF}$ ,  $\text{♂FM}$ ,  $\text{♂MF}$ ,  $\text{♂MM}$ ), and then extending this class to  
 19 all relatives linked to  $\text{♂MF♂}$  by the iteration of  $\text{♂ñwana♂}$  (“son of”) and of  $\text{♂tatana♂}$  (“father  
 20 of”). This amounts to extending the *kokwana-b* category to the entire mother’s father’s lineage.  
 21 Here is the catch: this lineage was previously reduced to the single “female self” term.

22 This being the case, there is no “generation difference” at the mother’s side to be cancelled  
 23 by a “skewing rule”, since no “mother lineage” gets started in the first place. As stated above, the  
 24 whole argument looks me very much like a re-statement of Radcliffe-Brown’s unity-of-lineage  
 25 thesis, which makes complete sense given the Lounsbury’s attack on Radcliffe-Brown’s thesis.

26 In Read’s model, the contrast between the two theories (Radcliffe-Brown’s lineage-model  
 27 and Lounsbury’s cognatic model for terminological structures) is phrased as the contrast between  
 28 a structure generated by a single generator “father” which generates a “male lineage” with an added  
 29 “single female generator” as a terminal symbol, i.e. as an absorbing term (the “same-sex female  
 30 sibling” operator, generating a degenerate lineage consisting of a single female term), and a

1 cognatic language in which “generation” germs and “sex changing” terms alternate as in  
2 Lounsbury’s model.

3 In my view, the interpretation of *mamana* is a stumbling block in the elimination of  
4 “skewing” in the “logic” of Tsonga’s kinship terminology. I should add the problem posed by the  
5 term *malume* (at  $G^{+1}$  generation from ego’s point of view) and by *nsati* and *kokwana/namu* (at  $G^0$   
6 generation from ego’s point of view). For, assuming a man’s terminological path to his *kokwana*  
7 (of either sex) as *tatana’s wife’s siblings*, this could be either *kokwana* or *malume* to the *tatana’s*  
8 son, according to relative age considerations. Avoiding this route, in favor of the circuit which  
9 goes through  $\text{♂FF} \rightarrow \text{♂FZ} \rightarrow \text{♂MZ} \rightarrow \text{♂MZS}$  does not solve the problem, for it left unresolved  
10 the relative-age issue.

11 For *mamana* is, from the father’s point of view, not just *nsati* (“wife”), because their  
12 younger siblings can be either *namu* (potential or “presumptive” wives, or “presumptive”  
13 brother’s-in-law) -- supposed to replace the actual *nsati* in case of divorce or absence of children  
14 by virtue of the *lobolo* payment --, or older wife’s siblings, *kokwana*, “wife givers’. This link  
15 cannot be recovered by the circuitous path which leads from ego to his MB through  $\text{FF} \rightarrow \text{♂MB}$   
16  $\rightarrow \text{♂MBS}$ .

17 This point brings to the fore the role of *malume*, which occupies the same genealogical  
18 place as *kokwana*. Here, the relevant point is that *kokwana* (a *father’s wife’s older sisters* or *older*  
19 *brothers*, i.e. a *father’s mukonwana*) is identified to *kokwana-b* ( $\text{♂MF}$ ). This identification is a  
20 consequence of Lounsbury’s Type III Omaha rule (corollary). On the other hand, *malume* ( $\text{♂MB}$ ,  
21 or properly speaking a *father’s wife’s younger sisters*, a *father’s tinamu*) must be identified with  
22 ( $\text{♂MBS}$ ). And this is a consequence of Lounsbury’s Type I Omaha Rule (corollary).

23 I conclude that relative age and affinity should be part of the explanation of *kokwana* and  
24 *malume*, and, simultaneously, of *mukonwana* and *namu* (which are the same “genealogical  
25 positions”, addressed from the point of view of son and father respectively).<sup>vi</sup>

26 That *kokwana* and *malume* can be formally generated by Lounsbury’s Type III and Type I  
27 rules is an interesting point, because it means that Lounsbury’s four Omaha types do not account  
28 for the Thonga case. Another, and more important conclusion is that *relative age* and *affinity* have  
29 an explanatory role that cannot be dismissed in explaining *kokwana*.

30

1 As a balance of my argument, let me point out what I see as positive contributions resulting  
2 from Read's research program. First, he points out the limitations of Lounsbury's taxonomy of  
3 "Omaha" systems -- it does not cover all possibilities. Secondly, it asserts the role of "culturally"  
4 determined rules over the "internal rules" – in the Thonga case, the role of relative age (as  
5 expression of hierarchy) and of bride-wealth (*lobolo*) is a paramount example of such culturally  
6 determined rules. As a contrast, I mention Central-Brazil instances of Omaha-like terminologies  
7 in which "skewing" is linked to the transmission of names (Coelho 2012, Lea 2012).

### 8 9 **Cognatic x agnatic**

10 I define a "cognatic" formal language as language which generates expressions by means  
11 of a "same-sex genitor" generator term and its inverse, together with an "opposite-sex sibling term"  
12 without a precedence rule. And an "agnatic" formal language is a language which generates  
13 expressions by means of a "male same-sex generator" and its inverse. According to Read, kinship  
14 terminologies of "patrilineal" societies (a sociological feature) can be represented as an "agnatic"  
15 core that is then transformed either into a 'female copy' isomorphic to the primary male  
16 terminology, or into a "female" degenerate copy with a single term, as in the Omaha instance. On  
17 the other hand, for all I can see, Thonga's kinship terms could as well be generated by means of  
18 the ♀*mamana*♀ from a female point of view.

### 19 20 **The role of self**

21 The syntactical role of "self" in the logic of kinship terminologies seems to be a feature of  
22 Western terminologies that distinguishes them from "classificatory" terminologies in Morgan's  
23 sense, that is to say, from terminologies which have a merging rule. Let me expand this argument.  
24 The "self" term, if I understood it right, distinguishes a speaker from his or her siblings, from the  
25 point of view of the external observer, since it is not a kinship term. It is characterized by its  
26 syntactical behavior. For instance, in English kinship terminology the two following equivalences  
27 are valid:

28  
29  $parent * self = parent$

30  $parent * sibling = uncle \text{ or } aunt$

1 as well as their reciprocals:

2  $self * child = child$

3  $sibling * child = nephew \text{ or } niece.$

4 From these equivalences, the following inequalities follow:

5  $self \neq sibling$

6  $lineal \neq collateral.$

7 If this analysis is correct, kinship terminologies that distinguish *self* and *sibling* and kinship  
8 terminologies that merge *self* and *siblings* belong to different classes – identified by Morgan with  
9 the “descriptive” and “classificatory” labels.

10 On the algebraical side, the inequality  $self \neq sibling$  results in the impossibility of unique  
11 inverses for *parent* or *child*, while the equality  $self = siblings$  results in the existence of inverses  
12 for *parent* and *child*. I put the case in the form of statements. In English kinship terms:

13  $parent * child = \{self, sibling\} = \{lineal, collateral\}$

14  $child * parent = \{self, spouse\} = \{lineal, affine\}$

15 These examples show that there is no unique inverse for “parent” or “child” in English  
16 kinship language, because the products can be either *lineal* or *collateral* relatives, according to the  
17 occurrence of *self* or *sibling* as intervening terms. On the other hand, in classificatory terminologies  
18 (i.e. having “same-sex sibling identification” rules and “half-sibling rules”), the following  
19 equations hold:

20  $(same\text{-}sex) parent * (same\text{-}sex child) = same\text{-}sex sibling$

21  $(same\text{-}sex child) * (same\text{-}sex parent) = same\text{-}sex sibling$

22  $(opposite\text{-}sex) parent * (opposite\text{-}sex child) = same\text{-}sex sibling$

23  $(opposite\text{-}sex child) * (opposite\text{-}sex parent) = same\text{-}sex sibling.$

24 In Thonga kinship terminology, accordingly, there is a unique inverse for “same-sex  
25 parent” ( $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$ ) which is “same-sex child” ( $\hat{\sigma}nwana\hat{\sigma}$ ), and for “opposite-sex parent”  
26 ( $\hat{\sigma}mamana\hat{\sigma}$ ) which is “opposed sex child” ( $\hat{\sigma}nwana\hat{\sigma}$ ). In these expressions the inverses are not  
27 lexically marked for gender. The corresponding algebraic expressions are:

28  $ff^{-1} = e \quad tatana * nwana = makwabu$

29  $f^{-1}f = e \quad nwana * tatana = makwabu$

30  $\hat{\sigma}sf^{-1}s = \hat{\sigma}e \quad \hat{\sigma}mamana\hat{\sigma}nwana\hat{\sigma} = \hat{\sigma}makwabu\hat{\sigma}$

1  $\uparrow f^1 s sf = \uparrow e \uparrow n w a n a \downarrow t a t a n a \uparrow = \uparrow m a k w a b u \uparrow$

2 To conclude this argument, I suggest that “self” is not a universally valid meta-kinship  
3 category. In particular, it is not syntactically adequate to the logic of classificatory terminologies,  
4 where the set of “same-sex siblings” is the set of objects on which “kinship operators” act: namely  
5 “identity” ( $e$ ), “opposite-sex sibling” ( $s$ ), “same-sex ascending generation” ( $f$ ) and “descending  
6 generation” ( $f^{-1}$ ), as well as their products, subject to additional constraints that lead to the rich  
7 spectrum of “classificatory systems”.<sup>vii</sup>

### 8 **Crossness and on affinity**

9 In a paper dated from 2010 I outlined a version of Lounsbury’s Omaha and Crow rules  
10 (Type I) from male and female points of view, expressed as transformations “crossness” (Barbosa  
11 de Almeida 2010c). These expressions are intended to show how crossness and affinity are  
12 structural consequences of “bifurcate” rules, and how kinship rules can be expressed in terms of  
13 them. I quote directly from this unpublished paper.

14 “... this apparently special case [ $\uparrow FZD \rightarrow \uparrow ZD, \downarrow MBS \rightarrow \downarrow MB$ ] is sufficient to generate all  
15 of Lounsbury's Omaha Type I derivations, when combined with the classificatory rules (C-  
16 rules) which are a generalization of Lounsbury's Merging Rule and Half-Sibling Rule”  
17 (Almeida 2010c).

18 “The Omaha Type I Rule, from the male point of view, is identical to the Crow Type I Rule  
19 expressed from the female point of view (the both transform a “same-side, same-sex cross-  
20 sibling” into a “same-side, same-sex cross-uncle”). And the Omaha Type I Rule, from the  
21 female point of view, is identical to the Crow Type I Rule expressed from the male point of  
22 view (both transform a “opposite-side, same sex cross-sibling into a same-sex genitor”)  
23 (Barbosa de Almeida 2010c)”.

### 24 **Models**

25 If the above comments have any pertinence, they imply that Read’s model, as any other  
26 model, encapsulates theoretical assumptions which are not supported uniquely by facts: among  
27 them, the privileged role of a “male point of view” and the secondary role assigned to sex  
28 difference, not to mention the absence of the female point of view in the terminology, and the  
29 special role bestowed to the “self” category. The choice is not between Read’s logic or “no logic  
30 at all”, but between different models which should be judged on their empirical consequences. The  
31 underlying issue is that models are inevitably underdetermined by facts – which is another way to

1 say that there is more than one way to account for empirical data (Duhem 2007[1904]:27, 31);  
2 Quine 1961[1953]:38,41-43).

3 I would like to mention, in this context, Read's point on Lounsbury's lack of 'explanatory'  
4 content, in the sense that Lounsbury's rules only describe *how* things happen, not *why* they happen.  
5 Read invokes Newton's laws of movement in support of his point. However, Newton's laws do  
6 not explain *what* gravity *is*, but only *how* bodies move when interacting with each other, a point  
7 made by Newton himself, who in *Opticks* manifested his perplexity on how anyone could be  
8 satisfied with the idea of instantaneous action at infinite distances, implied in his laws of  
9 movement. Newton's laws produce predictions according to laws – and this, if an analogy holds,  
10 what one should expect from Lounsbury's rules: to predict the use of kinship terms according to  
11 rules.

12 Lounsbury's rules were phrased as rewriting rules, which are mechanical actions on a string  
13 of symbols. However, this computational system is supposed to have empirical relevance. This  
14 exigence is expressed in the following way. Given a dictionary which *translate primary vernacular*  
15 *kinship terms* in the formal language of kin types (B, Z, F, M, W, H), the same result is obtained,  
16 either by calculating with vernacular terms and then translating the result into the formal language,  
17 or by translating the vernacular terms into the formal language and calculating in it. In short: the  
18 translation of the product of terms (obtained in the vernacular language) must be the product of  
19 the translation of terms (in the formal language). In order to make this precise, it is of course  
20 necessary to specify precisely the rules of the formal language.

21 This model-construction applied to kinship "logic" should not be mistaken with the  
22 grammatical rules of a language, a point already made by Morgan. For instance, English kinship  
23 expressions are formed from left to right (e.g. *father's sister*, abbreviated as FZ), while Portuguese  
24 and French kinship expressions are formed from right to left (*irmã da mãe, soeur de mère*).<sup>viii</sup>  
25 Notwithstanding, francophone and anglophone anthropologists understand each other on the  
26 structure of kinship terminologies. The same happens in mathematical notation, where the  
27 composition of functions  $f$  and  $g$  (first apply  $f$ , then apply  $g$  on  $f(x)$ ) is noted as  $g(f(x)) = gf(x)$  in  
28 Calculus books, while it is written as  $(x)fg$  in some algebra books (cf. Herstein 1975:11). Read  
29 favors the Calculus style, which coincides with French and Portuguese syntax. It goes without saying  
30 that grammatical difference is irrelevant from the point of view of mathematical structure – which

1 is to it as deep structure is to surface structure in linguistics --, just as the use of parenthesis-free  
2 Polish notation or the more usual parenthetical notation does not affect the expression logical laws.

3 The point here is that it is desirable to put arguments about ‘kinship logic’ in  
4 mathematically neutral forms, as opposed to the use of English vernacular terms. This remark  
5 applies in the first place to Lounsbury’s formalization, which, by using the “kin type notation”,  
6 invites the mixing of the structure of English kinship terms with its use as a formal language. This  
7 mixing-up was intended to facilitate understanding. But it was also a consequence of Lounsbury’s  
8 own interpretation of his basic symbols as expressions of universal components of the human  
9 family, from which all composite terms were supposed to be “extensions”.

10 The formal language proposed by Trautmann, unfortunately without adhesion among  
11 specialists, with the notable exception of Tjon Sie Fat (1998), is an improvement on Lounsbury’s  
12 system for three reasons: it uses formal symbols (not “kin types” as abbreviated English terms),  
13 it is relational (it is independent of a particular “ego”, being “coordinate-free”), and it is  
14 componential (it has semantic content). It is also algebraic. Ultimately, Trautmann’s symbolism  
15 reduces all relations expressible in kin type language to products of two basic relations: the  
16 siblingship operators (“same-sex, same-generation sibling”  $C_{=}^0$  and “opposite-sex, same-  
17 generation sibling”  $C_{\neq}^0$ ) and the generation operators (“same-sex, ascending generation  
18 consanguine”  $C_{=}^{+1}$  and its inverse “same-sex, descending generation consanguine”  $C_{=}^{-1}$ ). In  
19 Trautmann’s calculus, the product should be non-commutative, since  $(C_{\neq}^0)(C_{=}^{+1}) = C_{\neq}^{+1}$  (e.g.  
20  $\hat{\sigma}ZM = \hat{\sigma}M$ ) while  $(C_{=}^{+1})(C_{\neq}^0) = A_{\neq}^{+1}$  (e.g.  $\hat{\sigma}FZ = \hat{\sigma}\text{Mother’s Affine}$ ). In algebraic style, the  
21 non-commutativity is expressed as  $sf = fsa$  or as  $sf = -fs$  (cf. Barbosa de Almeida 2010a).<sup>ix</sup>

22 I substituted the  $e$  for Trautmann’s operator  $C_{=}^0$ , by analogy with algebraic use of  $e$  for the  
23 identity operator, and  $s$  for Trautmann’s operator  $C_{\neq}^0$ ; and I employed the symbol  $f$  for  
24 Trautmann’s operator  $C_{=}^{+1}$  and the symbol  $f^{-1}$  for its inverse  $C_{=}^{-1}$ . By composing these symbols  
25 -- each of them expressing a *single* difference --, *all* kin type expressions can be expressed, which  
26 makes evident the group-theoretical character of “merging rules” and “half-sibling” rules which  
27 are diagnostic of “classificatory terminologies”. This fact is veiled by using symbols borrowed  
28 from English kinship language.

1           **Kinship as indigenous mathematics**

2           Non-Western cultures have applied mathematical operations to social relations as well as  
3 to handicrafts, navigation and tool-making. Kinship terminologies are another instance of  
4 indigenous mathematical thinking. Morgan proposed as the object of a new science the  
5 comparative study of “plans” common to kinship terminologies, independently from their  
6 linguistic expressions, as Trautmann has brilliantly argued (Trautmann 2008, cf. Almeida 2010).  
7 However, to describe these “plans” – or structural patterns --, it is necessary to use abstract  
8 representation – just as abstract group theory brought to light the structural features common to  
9 several domains of mathematics and physic, as well as to crystallography and decorative patterns.

10           Lévi-Strauss famously deconstructed the concept of totemism as a single phenomenon, by  
11 splitting it in the overlapping domains of terminologies, taxonomies, and marriage practices. This  
12 insight opened the way for his later focus on *pensée sauvage* as possessing a non-written  
13 taxonomy, an idea which he traced back to Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. In an analogous  
14 way, it is safe to say that “kinship”, rather than a single object, is an overlapping zone of at least  
15 three different domains of human life, namely: descent/marriage rules, cosmological-ontological  
16 systems, and computational-mathematical calculi. From this point of view, the question about  
17 “what kinship is” has at least three different answers, mutually compatible because not really  
18 dealing with the same subject-matter: namely, social norms (e.g. Leach’s “kinship as language for  
19 transmission of landed property”), ontology (e.g. Sahlins’ “mutuality of being”) and  
20 ethnomathematics (e.g. Lounsbury’s rewriting rules, Trautmann’s calculus, André Weil group-  
21 theoretical models and Tjon Sie Fat’s generalization of them).

22           This is an occasion to comment on a frequent misunderstanding regarding “rewriting  
23 rules”, which consists in seeing them as a gimmick without theoretical relevance. This  
24 misunderstanding evokes Malinowski’s “mock-algebra” characterization of studies of kinship  
25 terminologies.

26           However, unknown to Malinowski, Emil Post proposed rewriting rules in the 1920s as the  
27 foundation of all possible computational processes, and therefore of logic and mathematics, a view  
28 which is equivalent to the concept of Turing machines.<sup>x</sup>

1 Lounsbury, as himself admitted, sacrificed elegance and simplicity for the sake of  
2 communication, by using the kin type language familiar to anthropologists. However, his  
3 generative approach was in the spirit of Emil Post of computation.

4 This is how Post's theory leads to a problem in kinship theory. Assuming that "rewriting  
5 rules" are given, and defining A and B as equivalent if they can be transformed into each other by  
6 applications of rewriting rules, then, in Post's own words,

7 "Thue's problem is then the problem of determining for arbitrarily given strings A, B ...  
8 whether, or no, A and B are equivalent" (Post 1947). xi

### 9 **Conclusions**

10 This is my first point: *classificatory features of kinship terminologies* can be best  
11 represented as the *group structure* organization of kinship-and-marriage terminologies among  
12 primitive societies, where the *group operating on a set* is generated by generation and sex changes  
13 acting on the set of *same-sex-sibling* categories. This group structure accounts for the "merging  
14 rules" (Lounsbury) and "same-sex sibling rules" (Trautmann and Whiteley 2012). The second  
15 point is this: constraints on this general *classificatory structure* produce varieties such as  
16 "Hawaiian" (with a commutative product for generation and sex) and "bifurcate" (where the  
17 product of generation and sex is not commutative), as well as other varieties, among which Crow-  
18 Omaha terminological calculus.

19 Read's program, among other significant innovations, revealed the implied 'self' term in  
20 American kinship language – a clue to distinguish Western kinship terminologies from others  
21 where the opposition "self"/"same-sex sibling", and even "self/sibling" (as in the Thonga case),  
22 although culturally recognized, does not have a central role in the terminological structure.

23 In other words, Read's logic of the American terminological structure is framed on the  
24 opposition of "self" to the class of "same-sex siblings", an opposition which results in the  
25 separation of "lineal" and "collateral" same-sex relatives. This move blurs Morgan's distinction  
26 between 'classificatory' (i.e. where the *merging* rule is the diagnostic feature) and "descriptive"  
27 (where "merging rules" do not apply), as well as the pertinence of the "crossness" concept for  
28 comparative purposes. Read's thesis has wide theoretical implications, and my extended comments  
29 on it is a tribute to its far-reaching implications.

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**Appendix I: A formal representation**

I will reconstruct one aspect of Read’s “male core” model, with the goal of making explicit its underlying mathematical structure. The “male core” structure is founded in three structural features: the “same-sex merging property” (to use Trautmann’s expression), the male generator feature, and the “generation-merging” rule. I will show that underlying mathematical structure is isomorph to the free group generated by a single element; which is isomorph to the chain of integers plus a “compactification” rule to impose an upper limit and a lower limit on it.

The “male core” structure is generated in two stages. In the first stage, the “same-sex ascending generator”  $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$  (with its inverse) generates a group which is the smallest set which contains  $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$ , its inverse  $\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}$ , and all products of  $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}$ , as well as the identity element, which in Read’s model can be represented as  $\hat{\sigma}self\hat{\sigma}$ .<sup>xii</sup> The set of all compositions of  $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}$  (where  $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma} = \hat{\sigma}male\ self\hat{\sigma}$ , and  $\hat{\sigma}male\ self\hat{\sigma}$  acts as the identity element) produces the image of a “free” group with infinite generations. An additional rule is introduced to “compactify” this infinite “male lineage”. The result is the finite “lineage” segment of 5 generations:

$$\hat{\sigma}ntukulu\hat{\sigma} < \hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma} < \hat{\sigma}nhondjwa^+ \hat{\sigma} / \hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}idjisana^-\hat{\sigma} < \hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma} < \hat{\sigma}kokwana\hat{\sigma}$$

As for the product rules, it suffices to know that  $\hat{\sigma}nhondjwa^+ \hat{\sigma} / \hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}idjisana^-\hat{\sigma}$  acts as the identity element  $\hat{\sigma}self\hat{\sigma}$ , and that  $\hat{\sigma}kokwana\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}ntukulu\hat{\sigma}$  are inverses to each other, as well as  $\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$ . Pairs of inverses are to be erased as well as the identity element  $e$  except when occurring alone. The following products are to be computed after all possible cancellations are made:

$$\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}\hat{\sigma}kokwana\hat{\sigma} = \hat{\sigma}kokwana\hat{\sigma}, \text{ and } \hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}\hat{\sigma}ntukulu\hat{\sigma} = \hat{\sigma}ntukulu\hat{\sigma}.$$

This is an algebraic description of Read’s Figures 2 and 3, without the “female self” operator. I think it useful to represent this concrete structure as an abstract structure-

To this end, I use the symbol  $f$  for same-sex, ascending generation, covering both  $\hat{\sigma}f\hat{\sigma}$  or  $\hat{\sigma}f\hat{\sigma}$  ( $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$  or  $\hat{\sigma}mamana\hat{\sigma}$ ), and the symbol  $e$  for same-sex sibling, covering  $\hat{\sigma}e\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}e\hat{\sigma}$  ( $\hat{\sigma}makwabu\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}makwabu\hat{\sigma}$ ) and playing the algebraic role of an identity element. All these terms have inverses: the inverse of  $f$  ( $\hat{\sigma}tatana\hat{\sigma}$ ,  $\hat{\sigma}mamana\hat{\sigma}$ ) is  $f^{-1}$  ( $\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}\tilde{n}wana\hat{\sigma}$ )

1 respectively), and the  $e$  is  $e$  ( $\♂makwabu♂$ ,  $\♀makwabu♀$ ). The symbol  $e^+$  stands for “older same-  
2 sex sibling” ( $\♂nhondjwa♂$ ,  $\♀nhondjwa♀$ ), with inverse  $e^-$  ( $\♂ndjisana♂$ ,  $\♀nidjisana♀$ ).

3 With this abstract representation, we realize that the male core has the algebraic structure  
4 of the free group generated by a single element  $f$  different from the identity. The group is a set and  
5 an operation: the set is composed by all products of  $f$ , its inverse  $f^{-1}$  and the identity  $e$ , and the  
6 operation is the concatenation subject to the cancellation rule: all pairs of  $f$  and its inverse  $f^{-1}$  are  
7 replaced by  $e$ , and all occurrences of  $e$  are erased except if  $e$  is isolated. The cancellation process  
8 condenses all merging rule when this abstract group is interpreted as a genealogical chain. It is  
9 easy to check that the result set is an infinite chain isomorph with the set of integers with the usual  
10 sum. This is the structure of an infinite succession of same-sex sibling groups.

11 This is represented as:

$$12 \quad L_\infty = \{ \dots f^{-n}, \dots, f^3, f^2, f^1, e, f^1, f^2, f^3, \dots, f^n \dots \}$$

13 There is no infinite set of kinship terms, just as there is no infinite number system among  
14 non-literate societies. And just as these societies usually have named numbers up to a (small) finite  
15 number, the unilinear kinship chain must be must be “compactified” to yield a manageable finite  
16 chain with a maximum and a minimum.

17 In kinship terminologies such as Tsonga and others, the compactification is produced by  
18 means of a rule that makes  $ff^2 = f^2$  and  $f^{-1}f^{-2} = f^{-2}$ . This can be called a “forgetting rule” (Almeida  
19 2010), and it reduces the lineage chain to five generations.<sup>xiii</sup>

20 The *free group generated by*  $\{\♂f\}$ , with the added “forgetting rule”, is isomorphic to the  
21 “male core” in the sense of Read (Figure 3), generated by  $\♂tatana♂$ . The following lines make  
22 this clear.

$$23 \quad \♂L_2 = \{ \♂f^2, \♂f^1, \♂e, \♂f, \♂f^2 \}$$

$$24 \quad \♂L_2 = \{ \♂ntukulu♂, \♂ñwana♂, \♂nhondjwa♂/\♂ndjisana♂, \♂tatana, \♂kokwana♂ \}.$$

25 Note that  $\♂tatana♂$  is already lexically marked as a “male term” (i.e. implying a male  
26 alter), while all other terms are lexically unmarked both for speaker and for alter.

27 The concatenation rules for vernacular terms are mirrored in the rules of the abstract group  
28 structure. In particular,  $\♂tatana♂tatana♂ = \♂kokwana♂$ , and  $\♂tatana♂kokwana♂ =$   
29  $\♂kokwana♂$  (by a forgetting rule). The pair *nhondjwa/ndjisana* plays the role of  $\♂self^+♂/\♂self^-$   
30  $\♂$ .

1 I expect that this representation captures the gist of Read's Figures 2 and 3. The point was  
2 to outline the mathematical structure underlying the "male core", which is that of a chain. This  
3 suggests that non-literate societies have mathematical models for social organization.

4 I consider now the free group generated by the set  $\{f, s\}$ , endowed with the concatenation  
5 operation, and with the added "forgetting" rule

$$6 \quad fK = K, f^{-1}K = K \text{ if in the sum of indices } n \text{ in } "f^n" \text{ is } 2 \text{ or } -2.$$

7 This is the set of all sequences of "s", "f" and "f<sup>-1</sup>" in any order, with all pairs  $ss, ff^{-1}$  and  
8  $f^{-1}f$ , erased, plus the identity  $e$ , having at most length 2.

9 These strings alternate generation change and sex change, and this alternation capture both  
10 the concept of "crossness" and of "marriage". The reason for this is that the string  $fsf^{-1}s$  (read  
11 ♂FZS, ♀MBD) expresses "crossness", while the string  $f^{-1}sf s$  (read ♂SZMB♂ = ♂WB, ♀DBFZ =  
12 ♀HZ) conveys "marriage".

13 This structure is easily ordered by generation, a "generation number" being the sum of the  
14 exponents of all occurrences of  $f$  and  $f^{-1}$ ). All kintypes can be represented in this universe. As  
15 examples, ♂FZS♂ corresponds to ♂ $fsf^{-1}s$  with length 0. The sex of a string is "same-sex" (♂) or  
16 "opposite-sex" (♀) according to whether the parity of "ss" is even or odd.

17 Such a construction generates an infinite structure isomorph to that of kintypes (reduced  
18 by merging rules). Generation rules ("compactifying" the generational length) and Dravidian or  
19 similar rules further reduce the set of expression to a finite set.

20 For example, one Dravidian rule makes  $fsf^{-1}s$ , (symbolized by  $\mathbf{x}$ ) its own inverse, which  
21 means that  $\mathbf{xx} = e$  (♂FZS = ♂MBS for a male speaker). Another Dravidian rule identifies  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{a}$   
22 (cross cousins are affines). The rules reduce all expressions to the four expressions:  $e, s, a$  and  $as$   
23 with  $a = x$  (Barbosa de Almeida 2010a). Additional generations rules reduce the number of distinct  
24 generations.

25 The fact that every kin expression (as expressed in kin types or in the proposed algebraic  
26 version) which is not reduced by classificatory rules or by generation-merging rules has the form  
27 of a cross expression (an expression alternating "same-sex generation changes" and "opposite sex  
28 siblings") supports the suggestion made by Trautmann: that a set of special rules distinguishing  
29 Iroquois, Dravidian, Crow-Omaha, and Jinglypaw are as many variations of the theme of crossness.

30

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<sup>i</sup> I quote Read on these points. First, on the role of the 'male terms' structure as a privileged origin:

"...we generate the Thonga terminology by first generating **the structure of ascending and descending male terms** shown in the kin term map of male term displayed in Figure 2, (Read 2018: 24)

"For our purposes here, we will only outline the generative logic for **the structure of ascending and descending male terms ...** our focus is on generating the Thonga terminology from this structure so as to determine whether the skewing property of this terminology arises from its generative logic." (Read 2018: 25).

Second, on the "female self" as incapable of generating a linear structure:

"... we find that the so-called skewing arises for **a simple reason**, namely only the male-marked terms arise through a generative logic that begins with male self, *tatana* ('father') and *nhondjwa* ('ascending brother') as primary, generating terms, whereas, in an asymmetric manner, the only generating term for the female marked terms is *self*. **This is the logic of a terminology that structurally only recognizes patriline**s" (Read 2018: 41)

"... there is no lineal generational structure for the female kin terms since the sole female generating term is *self* and *self* is an identity element among female kin terms, so self of self = self... Thus, what is referred to as skewing is, in the case of the Thonga terminology, is the *absence of a generational structure*. (...) The absence of structure means that **female marked terms defined through products of self with male terms need not structurally preserve generation differences.**" (p. 41).

ii "...the absence of a generative structure for female terms indicates that the **Thongan terminology excludes the mother relation as a primary generating concept**" (p. 41) "... rather than the kin term relation of the uterine nephew to his maternal uncle being determined through the consanguine kin term product, *kokwana* ('opposite sex sibling') of *mamana* ('mother'), it is given, instead, by the affine kin term product, (*kokwana* ('opposite sex sibling') of *nsati* ('wife')) of *tatana* ('father')". (Read 2018: 42, boldface mine).

iii “... the absence of a generative structure for female terms indicates that the **Thongan terminology excludes the mother relation as a primary generating concept**” (p. 41) “... rather than the kin term relation of the uterine nephew to his maternal uncle being determined through the consanguine kin term product, *kokwana* (‘opposite sex sibling’) of *mamana* (‘mother’), it is given, instead, by the affine kin term product, (*kokwana* (‘opposite sex sibling’) of *nsati* (‘wife’)) of *tatana* (‘father’)”. (Read 2018: 42, boldface mine).

iv Running the risk of redundancy, I will go back to the distinction between *rarana* and of *mamana*. While *mamana* is lexically a “female self” (not requiring any transformation), *rarana* must be transformed by the ♂male♂female♀ operator, i.e. by the “opposite-sex sibling” operator. This is the “consanguine/affine distinction. I now quote Junod from the French translation of the second edition of his book:

“L’un de mes informateurs, en me décrivant ces deux catégories de parents par alliance, me dit: Les *bakoñwana* (femmes) sont celles qui vous procurent des épouses; les *tinamou* (femmes) sont celles qui vous procurent des enfants, car ce sont vos femmes présomptives. Même si vous ne les épousez pas, leurs enfants vous appelleront (Junod 1927/1936:224).

v This case brings to the fore Tjon Sie Fat’s argument on the role of non-associativity in kinship terminologies. I rejected this point in the context of Dravidian terminologies, but I acknowledge its relevance in the relative-age context.

vi According to Junod, wife’s older sisters are assimilated to the ascending generation and thus forbidden as potential wives (they are a man’s *mukonwana*), while his wife’s younger sisters, are potential wives (*namu*). This distinction is paralleled in the man’s in-laws, who are ambiguously addressed as *mukonwana* (assimilated to fathers-in-law, called as *kokwana* by his son) and as *namu* (brother-in-law), called as *malume* by his son. Thus, a father’s *namu* is called *malume* by his son, who also calls *malume* his *malume*’s son (this is Lounsbury’s Rule I – Corollary). Junod’s explanation of *kokwana* in the second edition of his treatise adds much information on affine relations. He discards Frazer’s list, and instead organizes his exegesis as a taxonomy which divides kinship terms into a “father’s side” and a “mother’s side” (*bukonwana*), further divided in “relatives by mother” and “relatives by marriage”. Recall that a man’s *mukoñwana* and *namu* are his son’s *kokwana* and *malume*. Note also that *kokwana* and *malume* have, according to Junod, distinct reciprocals – at least in old usage – and should therefore be treated as distinct relationships. The pairs are *kokwana/ntukulu* and *malume/mupsyana*.

vii The relative-age structure creates a linear order within the “same-sex sibling” category. This ordering has a significant role in Thonga terminological calculus.

viii Portuguese and Spanish call *brother* and *sister* by a common root (*irmão/irmã, hermano/hermana*) while English and French have *brother/sister*, and *frère/soeur* to distinguish male siblings from female siblings. *irmãos*” or “brothers”).

ix The non-commutative propriety of kinship terminologies when expressed in relational (algebraic) form is the main technical point in Almeida 2010. It should be noted that “Hawaiian” product, on the contrary, is commutative, as it obeys the rule  $fs = sf$ , as in the following instances:  $[\♂FZ] = [\♂ZM]$  and  $[\♀BF] = [\♀MB]$ .

x The mathematical structure of kinship terminologies – as distinguished from their semantic interpretations -- was early on recognized by Bertrand Russell, who expressed a famous proof of the set-theoretical Bernstein-Schröder theorem in the language of the (unilinear) ancestor-descendant relation, which also models the structure of the integers.

xi In Almeida 2010 I set out to prove that that every kinship expression composed of primary “same-sex genitor” and “opposed-sex sibling” and their reciprocals is reducible to four categories per generation, namely *e, s, a, as*, standing for “same-sex sibling”, “opposite-sex sibling”, “same-sex affine”, “opposite-sex affine”, assuming two “Dravidian axioms” expressing formally the equivalence “wife-givers” and of “wife-takers” and the equivalence of “in-laws” and

**ALMEIDA’S COMMENT ON READ: GENERATIVE CROW-OMAHA TERMINOLOGIES**

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“cross-cousins”. I gave two different proofs, one based on induction on the length of expressions, and another based on theorems of Group Theory that say that every permutation is the product of transpositions (the permutation of just two symbols), and that the parity of a permutation (odd parity meaning “affine” and even parity meaning “cross”) is the same whatever the sequences of transpositions is used (rules can be used in whatever order). This seemed to be a solution for the problem of Thue in the case of “Dravidian systems” But there is a catch: the “Dravidian transformations require the introduction of a “parity” symbol in its rules. It is this circumstance which, according to Post, accounts for the possibility of solving the “word problem

<sup>xii</sup> The relation between  $\mathfrak{S}self\mathfrak{S}$  and  $\mathfrak{S}nhondjwa\mathfrak{S}/\mathfrak{S}ndsijana\mathfrak{S}$  (*male same-sex sibling*) in Read’s model has crucial theoretical significance and should be the subject of a separate analysis.

<sup>xiii</sup> Another major method for limiting the generation length of the universe of kin words is to impose a modulus-n rule, i.e. a modular arithmetic for generation counting. Thus, Cashinahua terminology generations are counted modulus 2, which means that  $ff = e$ . According to Ruth Vaz, some variants of Dravidian terminologies have the same rule, which also holds for Allen’s “tetradic model” of Allen. There is evidence that the Kariera terminology has a generation system modulus 4, which means that  $f^4 = e$ . Mathematically, this means that in these terminologies the set of kinship terms, together with a composition law, is isomorphic to a free group subject to the equation  $f^n = e$ .